fix(ci): pin third-party actions to full commit SHAs - #201
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The account's Actions policy requires a full-length SHA ref. A tag or branch ref is refused at startup — `startup_failure`, no jobs, "this workflow graph cannot be shown" — so these workflows could not run at all. This resolves each ref to the commit it currently points at and records the ref in a trailing comment, e.g. `actions/checkout@<sha> # v4`. `dtolnay/rust-toolchain` takes its toolchain from the ref itself, so those steps also gained an explicit `with: toolchain:` input; without it, a SHA ref would silently lose the channel. No behaviour is intended to change beyond the pins.
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Oct 1, 2026
…rt it (#209) ## Why `hyperpolymath/echidna` has `sha_pinning_required: true`. Its **Security Scan** calls this reusable and has ended in `startup_failure` since the pinning rule landed. The run page for echidna run 36185528155 says: > The actions actions/checkout@v4.3.1, dtolnay/rust-toolchain@v1, and swatinem/rust-cache@v2.8.2 are not allowed in hyperpolymath/echidna … `actions/checkout` is GitHub-owned, and echidna has `github_owned_allowed: true`. So the allow-list is not the cause; the tag refs are. A caller's own `actions.lock` does not cover a cross-repo callee's steps, so the callee has to carry commit SHAs itself. **Positive control:** echidna's Scorecard and Secret Scanner succeed through `standards/*-reusable.yml@571cc73`, whose steps are written `@<sha> # vX`. #201 had pinned these steps. #203's `gh actions-lock` rewrite turned them back into tags. ## Change - Pins the three steps: - `actions/checkout@3d3c42e5` (v7.0.1) - `dtolnay/rust-toolchain@02cb101e` (v1) - `Swatinem/rust-cache@6323deb1` (v2.9.2) - Updates the `actions.lock` entry by hand to match, because `gh actions-lock` write mode de-pins the steps again. - Changes `toolchain: v1` to `stable`. `v1` is the action's tag, not a Rust toolchain. - Leaves one "managed by gh actions-lock" line after SPDX, instead of three. ## Verification `gh actions-lock --no-fix --json`: - This file: 0 errors, and 3 `sha-as-ref` warnings (the same advisory the standards reusables carry). - Repo total: 67 findings on main, 66 with this change, none new. The rest of the lock was already stale on main; that is out of scope here. ## Also: unblocks CodeQL (second commit) `codeql.yml` was bumped to `checkout@v7.0.1` / `codeql-action@v4.38.2`, but its `actions.lock` entry still pinned v6.0.2 / v4.34.0. So every CodeQL run since `5e75753` died at startup with "Invalid lockfile". CodeQL is main's only required check, so no PR could merge. The second commit re-keys that entry, using commit SHAs resolved from the tags. On this head, CodeQL goes from `startup_failure` to `success`. `--no-fix` repo errors go from 64 to 58. ## Pre-existing reds (deferred) These contexts are red identically on `main` `5e75753`. This PR introduces none of them. They are deferred to #211: `chapel-ci`, `Dogfood Gate`, `Dependency Review`, `bridge-gate`, `cargo-audit.yml`, `coverage.yml`, `release.yml`, `Governance` (Workflow security linter, Actions lockfile verify), `Secret Scanner` (gitleaks), `Rust CI` (clippy, fmt). The failing check contexts are each deferred to #211: `scan / gitleaks` (#211), `rust-ci / Cargo check + clippy + fmt` (#211), `governance / Workflow security linter` (#211), `governance / Actions lockfile verify` (#211). ## Follow-up echidna's `security-scan.yml` has to bump its callee pin to this merge commit (echidna#310). 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) https://claude.ai/code/session_01SJGZgoR9ArMgxKcqG7ChW8 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fix(ci): pin third-party actions to full commit SHAs
The account's Actions policy requires a full-length SHA ref. A tag or branch ref is refused at
startup —
startup_failure, no jobs, "this workflow graph cannot be shown" — so these workflowscould not run at all. This resolves each ref to the commit it currently points at and records the
ref in a trailing comment, e.g.
actions/checkout@<sha> # v4.dtolnay/rust-toolchaintakes its toolchain from the ref itself, so those steps also gained anexplicit
with: toolchain:input; without it, a SHA ref would silently lose the channel.No behaviour is intended to change beyond the pins.